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Abstract 
This paper examines optimal income tax progressivity when avoidance responses 
to taxation are important, and can be controlled at some cost by the government. A 
simple example shows that ignoring the fact that avoidance can be controlled - that 
the leak in Okun’s bucket can be fixed - can lead to misleading implications about 
the optimal degree of tax rate progressivity. The paper then generalizes the standard 
modei of the optimal linear income tax to include taxpayer avoidance behavior and 
the ability of government to control the avoidance, but not the labor supply, 
response to higher marginal tax : ites. The discussion suggests that if the tax burden 
is to be made more progressive, base broadening and increased enforcement ought 
to be considered as alternatives, or complements, to increasing tax rates for 
high-income individuals. 
1. Introduction 
In Equality and EfJicieny: The Big Tradeoff, Okun (1975) proposed a 
hypothetical experiment for testing one’s attitudes toward the tradeoff 
* Prepared for the Conference on Tax Administration and Tax Policy, co-sponsored by the 
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between equality and efficiency. In the experiment a tax on the most 
affluent 5 percent of families finances a grant for families in the lowest 
quintile of the income distribution. Okun notes that the program has ‘an 
unsolved technological problem: the money must be carried from the rich to 
the poor in a leaky bucket. . . , SO the poor will not receive all the money 
that is taken from the rich’ (p. 91). How much leakage - representing the 
inefficiency due to tax-and-transfer programs - one would tolerate, and still 
support the program, measures one’s (marginal) terms of trading off 
efficiency and equity. To Okun the inefficiencies of redistribution included 
primarily the adverse effects on the economic incentives of the rich and the 
poor, and the administrative costs of tax collection and transLr programs. 
The modern theory of optimal taxation has formalized the question of 
designing a tax system that minimizes the inefficiency cost, and of trading off 
the inefficiency and the social benefit of a more equal distribution of 
welfare. Until recently, the optimal taxation literature focused entirely on 
the incentive effects, to the exclusion of collection costs, although the latter 
has recently been introduced by Mayshar (1991) and others. 
For the most part the incentive cost of taxation has been equated with the 
behavioral response of individuals to changes in relative prices, in particular 
the relative price of leisure and goods. It is the substitution away from goods 
toward leisure caused by taxing labor income that is the source of the 
inefficiency first studied by Mirrlees (1971), and in most subsequent 
treatments of optimal income tax progressivity. 
The theoretical emphasis on the sensitivity to taxation of ‘real’ variables 
such as labor supply is, however, troubling in the light of much recent 
evidence [Slemrod (1992)] that an equally pe, dasive kind of response to 
taxation involves activities which reduce tax liability without requiring a 
substitution of one good for another, or one input for another. This includes 
a wide range of activities, such as receiving labor compensation as untaxed 
fringe benefits or preferentially taxed capital gains via stock options, 
expending revenues to legally reduce taxable income, or illegally underre- 
porting taxable income. In this paper I will refer to these activities as tax 
avoidance. The operational distinction between what I call tax avoidance 
and the stand?4 behavioral response such as reducing labor supply is that 
the amount of tax avoidance is endogenous to’other policy instruments such 
as the extent of monitoring of taxpayer reports and the extent of ‘loopholes’ 
in the definition of taxable income. 
How applicable are the standard optimal tax prescriptions to a world 
where avoidance responses are important ? Do the same rules apply with a 
straightforward reinterpretation, or is a fundamental rethinking of the 
normative took kit required? This paper begins a treatment of these issues 
by reexamining one of the fundamental normative questions of tax policy - 
optimal incom t3x progressivity - in a stylized economy characterized by 
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both kinds of behavioral response to taxation.’ It begins in section 2 with a 
simple example of an economy where the optimal income tax schedule must 
be considered simultaneously with the optimal enforcement regime of that 
schedule. Section 3 generalizes the example by characterizing the optimal 
linear income tax cum enforcement system. Section 4 offers some conclud- 
ing comments. 
2. A simple numerical example 
Consider an economy consisting of two persons whose abilities (assumed 
equal to wage rates) differ. The government is presumed to maximize a 
concave social welfare function, and can levy a linear income tax on the 
high-income individual (denoted H) and transfer the revenue collected from 
H, net of administrative costs, in a lump-sum fashion to the low-income 
individual (denoted L). There is no labor-leisure choice, so that before-tax 
incomes are fixed. The high-income individual can, at some cost, reduce her 
tax liability by an amount A, representing tax alroidance. The cost of tax 
avoidance depends on government expenditure on enforcement, denoted E. 
Let the cost of avoidance be 
EA’ 
c=; y- , -( 1 (1) 
so that the marginal cost of avoidance is increasing and is proportional to E. 
In this example the high-income individual faces the following problem: 
max Yn = wu - @vi, - A) - 
’ A 
(2) 
The optimal level of A is then equal to at/E. Let Y,*,(E, t) be net income, 
given that an optimal amount of A is chosen. Then 
Y;(E, t) = (1 - t)w,, + 
(_ 1 
$ t”. 
Revenue, net of enforcement costs, is equal to 
R = t(w,, - A)-E=+,,-s)-E. (4) 
This is the amount that can be transferred to the low-income individual. 
whose income, Y,_, is simply wi_ + R. 
The government’s problem can now be stated explicitly as 
’ An early treatment of this issue is Sandmo (1981). who examines optimal progrcs:‘ivity and 
cnforccment in an economy with tax evasion. 
where CY is an (inverse) measure of the taste for egalitarianism embedded in 
the social welfare function. 
The nature of the optimal progressivity problem of expression (5) is 
similar to the standard one where there is no avoidance behavior, except 
that there is no labor-leisure choice. Increasing I transfers welfare from H 
to L. up to a point,’ but it also causes a deadweight loss to the economy. Pn 
this model the deadweight loss is C + E, or (atbE) + E. If ti were equal to 
one, so there is no preference for equality, social welfare would be 
maximized at t = 0, E = 0, and W would equal M’~~ + w,.. 
Table 1 presents the solutions to this problem for the case where w,, = 3 
and \I’* = I. I investigate values of cy equal to - 1, -2, or -3, and values of 
II equal to 0.5, 1 .O. or 1.5. Note that the parameter u is a proportionality 
constant in the cost of avoidance function - the higher is a, the lower the 
cost of avoidance; 1‘ refers to the tax paid by individual H. 
In this example, for a constant value of (I, increasing egalitarianism (lower 
cu) calls for both a higher tax rate and higher expenditure on tax 
Solutions to ;L numerical cxamplc of the optim:il linear tax pohlcm when avoidancc can bc 
ctN~tr_c~lllXi 
-I 0.5 0.374 r1.221 il.85 0. ii-l 2.03 1.59 
-- I I .o 0.358 0.314, 1.12 0.3i 2.13 1.35 
-I I.5 0.266 ()..3Oh 1.30 0.17 2.38 1.15 
- 3 0.5 0.41 1 0.243 0.x5 0.17 1.93 1.64 
3 I .o ().-I.~7 0.390 1.12 0.23 I .w 1.43 
-7 I.5 0.424 O.-MC) 1.30 0.28 2.00 1.23 
--3 0.5 O.-l3 0.253 0.80 0.18 1.89 I ( . 
-- 7 I .a1 0.475 0.424 1.13 (!.27 1.83 
-- -3 I.5 0.49); 0.473 I .30 (1 3? . . c i.23 
-7 I.1 0.4X 0.415 I.16 0.25 I .9-l ;c) 
._ 
3 1.1 0.425 O.Z?O” 1.20 0.25 I.98 ..I< 






















enforcement? In fact, for this example the ratio oft to E is invariant to CY. SO 
that l and E increase proportionally as LY declines. The deadweight loss also 
increases with egalitarianism. 
A change in the cost of avoidance. for a given value of a. does not have a 
consistent effect on optimal policy. For ail1 values of a, facilitated avoidance 
(higher a) reduces both the optimal amount of tax and the optimal transfer, 
and therefore makes the low-income individual worse off. H\>wever, with 
relatively low egalitarianism (CX = -1) the optimal reaction to a higher value 
of a is to give in by reducing tax rates (although enforcement is increased), 
and allowing the high-income individual to reap some of the benefits 
of increased avoidance expenditure. With much greater egalitarianism 
(a = -3) the optimal reaction to facilitated avoidance is to sharply increase 
enforcement and also increase tax rates. somewhat offsetting the otherwise 
sharp decline in welfare of the low-income individual, but at the cost of 
reducing the welfare of the high-income individual. 
The bottom three rows of Table I offer further insight into this example. 
First focus on the third-to-last row, where cy = -2 and a = 1.1. Compared 
with the case of cy = -2, a = 1, this represents an exogenous decrease in the 
cost of avoidance. If both t and E are re-optimized, they both rise. BLL. as 
the second-to-last row ;hows, if E is held constant at 0.390, the optimal 
response is to reduce, not raise, the tax rate. The last row offers a similar 
exercise. FIolding cy at -3 when a goes from 0.5 to 1.5 the optimal response 
is to increase both t and E. However, if E is held constant at 0.253, the 
optimal response of t is a sharp decline. 
These examples illustrate the critical difference between an optimal 
progressivity model with avoidance and one with only a labor-leisure 
tradeoff - that the former kind of leakage can be controlled by government 
policy. In the standard model an exogenous increase in the elasticity of 
substitution inevitably leads to a decline in optimal progressivity, as the 
social cost per unit of redistribution becomes higher. In these examples. an 
exogenous increase in leakiness (higher a) decreases t only if E is held 
constant. Note, though, that even though t increases in the new optimum, 
the transfer to the low-income individual is less than when a is ‘lower, i.e. 
under a less leaky tax system. 
3. The optimal linear income tax and optimal tax ase enforceme 
In this section I generalize the now-standard model of the optimal linear 
income tax, with notation adapted from Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980). 10 
3 It is also true, though not shown in Tahie 1, that the opti!,lal value 
increasing in t; also, the optimal value of t for given I:‘ is i~crtzasing in 15. 
of E for given t is 
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include taxpayer avoidance behavior. In this expanded model the individual 
maximizes utility U(Y, L) subject to 
Y = wL - QvL - A) + G - C(A, E, w) , (6) 
where Y is after-tax income, w is the wage rate, L is labor supplied, I is the 
constant marginal tax rate, and G is the demogrant. Individuals can reduce 
their taxable income by an amount A, at a cost to them of C, which depends 
not only on the amount of avoidance achieved but also kjn government 
expenditures on enforcement, denoted E,’ so that CA > 0 and C, > 0. 
The first-order conditions for L and A, assuming an interior solution, are 
L: (1 - t)wU, + u, = 0 (7) 
and 
A : t = Cfi . (8) 
is 




(wt - 44) dF, (9) 
Ir’ I_ 
where pi_ and 1~~~ are, respectively, the lower and upper bound on wage 
rates and R is the exogenous per capita revenue requirement. 
The government is assumed to maximize the social welfai q function 




{+ + @(wL - A) - E - G - R]} dF , 
1%’ , 
we can derive the first-order conditions as follows: 






’ Although I refer to E as cnforccn~cnt, it can also bc thought of a:, including such things as a 
costly hroadcning of the tax base. 
$1 !I 
au 
a: @ar +h;(wL-A)+t 111 dF=(?, (13) 
‘(’ f .
E: j- (t/Y%-+h[t(w$+) - Il)dF=O. 
w’L 
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where S,, aud SAi are tkc sub,sGtution terms, and the facts that W/at = 
-a(wL - A), &U/&3 = 1~ and dUIdE = --dcc where cy is the private 










The first-order condition for E says that, at the margin, the avoidance cost 
saving from one dollar of increased enforcement, weighted by the marginal 
social valuation of the dollars saved, should equal to mIuus any extra 
revenue collected because the increased enforcement increases the tax base 
by causing either additional labor supply or reduced avoidance). 
Following Atkinson and Stiglitz, we now define b to be the net social 
marginal valuation of income (modified to include the income effect of the 
revenue loss from avoidance): 
6 gh, aL aA 
“A+t w--- ( aM ) ail.4 * (1% 
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t: j-q = 
-cov[b, WL - A] 
I 
(21) 
WLQ~ dF + 
I 
AEAr dF ’ 
where 6 is the mean value of 6, &LL is the compensated wage elasticity of 
labor (=w(l - t)S,,IL), and E,, is the compensated tax elasticity of 
avoidance5 expressed in wage-equivalent units (=( I - t)S,,lA). 
Compare expression (16) for the optimal marginal tax rate with the one 
found in Atkinson and Stiglitz (pp. 405-409, for the case without avoid- 
ance: 
t -cov(b, WL) 
-= 
1 - t c WLQ~ dF ’ 
(22) 
Clearly expression (22) is a special case of expression (21) in which the cost 
of avoidance is infinite, at a zero or infinitesimal value of E, SO that A and 
F,, are both zero. In the numerator of expression (21) -cov[b, WL - A] 
replaces -covjb, wL], because WL - A and not wL is pre-tax income. This 
implies, for example, that if A is more concentrated among high-income 
taxpayers than wL, then Icov[b, WL - Ali < Icov[b, wL]l, so that the optimal 
tax rate is lower. This reflects the fact that t redistributes income through its 
effect on the tax base, and to the extent that the skewness of A erodes the 
effectiveness of the tax HEW as a measure of well-being, t is a less effective 
instrument for redistributing income. 
The denominator is also a!tered. In the Atkinson-Stiglitz version, it is the 
compensated labor supply elasticity, weighted by labor income. In the 
expanded version, it is that plus the compensated avoidance elasticity, 
weighted by the amount of avoidance. Both kinds of leaks increase the 
costliness of redistributing income. Ceteris paribus, a higher avoidance 
elasticity lowers the optimal marginal tax rate because it increases the 
marginal resource cost per dollar of revenue raised for an increase in t. 
Although Q, depends on the shape of individuals’ preferences, the value 
of A E...\~ in general depends on government policy, represented by the 
parameter E. In the numerical example of section 2, it is inversely 
proportional to E, so that when E increases, AQ, declines, increasing the 
optimal value of t, ceteris paribus. This illustrates that the problem of setting 
’ The simple form of the maximization problem of ( 1) dictates that S.,, = (1 /c.l,, ). 
the optimal progressivity of the income tax cannot be separated from the 
problem of optimally enforcing whatever tax system is in place. 
In the problems considered so far there has been no direct interaction 
between the terms of the labor-leisure tradeoff and the terms of the 
avoidance decision. Such a direct interaction could be introduced in a 
variety of ways. For example, in a graduated income tax system increased 
avoidance could reduce the marginal tax rate and thereby increase the 
relative price of leisure. Alternatively, private expenditure on avoidance 
could be modelled as reducing the fraction of income that is subject to tax, 
rather than as reducing the amount of taxable income. In this case the 
marginal tax rate on an incremental dollar of labor income is t( 1 - A’), 
where A’ is the fraction of taxable income that is avoided. in this sense 
avoidance directly affects the terms of the labor-leisure tradeoff, and could 
affect the deadweight loss due to an inefficiently low labor ~upply.~ The 
implications of this alternative formulation are worth pursuing in future 
research. 
4. The appropriate policy reaction to evidence of increased behavioral 
responsiveness: A reinterpretation of the 1980s 
One of the most stunning tax developments of the 1980s in the United 
States was the steep decline in the statutory progressivity of the income tax 
schedule; the U.S. income tax rate at the highest incomes fell from 70 
percent in 1980 to 28 percent by 1988. During the decade many other 
countries also flattened their income tax rate structure, although most did so 
in a less extreme way. Although some of the decline in the graduation of 
rates was offset by base-broadening measures, most observers agree that 
during this period in the United States the burden of taxation shifted away 
from the highest income groups. 
Two, not mutually exclusive, explanations have been offered for this 
phenomenon. One is that political power shifted toward the parties that 
represented the interests of the wealthy, and once in power these parties 
effected a transfer of resources (compared with earlier tax regimes) toward 
their constituency. An alternative explanation is that by 1980 economists 
had convincl=d policy-makers that the incentive costs of progressive income 
taxation were high enough that, at the margin, they outweighed whatever 
benefits of redistribution they provided - ‘supply-side economics’. In the 
extreme version of this view, associated with Arthus Laffer, the incentive 
effects at the margin were so large that decreases in tax rates would actually 
” Alternatively, the avoidance cost function could be written as C’(AlrrlL. E) 
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bring in greater revenues, and would therefore potentially benefit all 
taxpayers. 
The argument presented in this paper suggests a competing explanation 
for the 1980s one that is in the same economics tradition as the supply-side 
story, but which has radically different policy implications. TO see the 
change in perspective, consider the following thought experiment. Suppose 
that definitive econometric evidence arrives to show that the behavioral 
response to taxation is greater than had been previously thought. What is 
the appropriate policy reaction, assuming that before the arrival of this 
information the income tax was optimally progressive? The answer in the 
Atkinson-Stiglitz framework is straightforward. According to expression 
(17), if eLL increases, then the optimal value of t falls, necessitating a fall in 
G to recover budget balance.7 The tax system becomes less progressive. 
But what is the appropriate policy response to new evidence about an 
increased avoidmce response ? At first glance at expression ( 16), a higher 
value of avoidance response reduces optimal t in the same way that an 
increased value of eLL would. It increases the marginal excess-burden-per- 
dollar-raised, and through this channel reduces the optimum value of t. 
The message of this paper is that this first-glance answer may be incorrect. 
First of all, an increased avoidance response will be accompanied by higher 
values of A, for any given tax system. Because the change in A will likely 
have a different distribution than WL - A, this will affect the value of 
co+, WL - A], as will the induced changes in b. Second, a change in 
avoidance responsiveness in general will change the optimal value of E, 
which will affect the avoidance responseness. Thus, the apparent decline in 
the optimal value of t when avoidance response increases, holding E 
~0~7,~t(ant, may be a misleading indicator of how optimal t changes when all 
the other instruments at the government’s disposal can change as well. How 
important a factor this is depends on the tax avoidance technology, i.e. the 
C(A, E, w) function. There is no doubt, though, that increasing the 
avoidance responsiveness increases the social cost of redistribution, and 
therefore reduces the optimal amount of redistribution, for any given social 
preferences. 
5. Conclusion: rsgsessivity in the 
Did the flattening of the income tax rate structure in the 1980s go too far? 
This is likely to be one of the major fiscal policy questions of the 1990s and 
debate on it has already begun. In the United States, the Clinton Adminis- 
7 A changed labor supply elasticity will also change the pattern of labor supply, potentially 
changing cov[b, M’L]. 
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tration tax proposals feature an increase in the top statutory income tax rate 
frolrn 31 to 39.6 percent. In the United Kingdom the Labour Party platform 
featured an even larger increase in the top rate. 
Traditionally, the principal contribution that economists could offer to 
this debate is measurement of how leaky is the bucket that would carry 
water (income) from high-income taxpayers1 to everyone else, or to the 
public sector. To be sure, there is compelling, though controversial, 
evidence that high-income people in the United States responded to the tax 
cuts in 1981 [Lindsey (1991)]. But an unresolved question is how much of 
the response can be categorized as avoidance and, to continue the analogy, 
at what cost the leak can be fixed. This discussion suggests that if the tax 
burden is to be made more progressive, base broadening and increased 
enforcement ought to be considered as alternatives, or at least comple- 
ments, to increasing tax rates for high-income individuals. 
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